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THE DEATH PENALTY AND PRE-TRIAL PUBLICITY:
ARE TODAY'S ATTEMPTS AT GUARANTEEING A
FAIR TRIAL ADEQUATE?
JOSEPH R. MARINIELLO*
In these days of newspaper enterprise and universal educa-
tion, every case of public interest is almost, as a matter of
necessity, brought to the attention of all the intelligent
people in the vicinity, and scarcely any one can be found
among those best fitted for jurors who has not read or
heard of it, and who has not some impression or some
opinion in respect to its merits.'
From the beginning of recorded history people have been
put to death for their crimes. While the curiosity of the general
public and media coverage of the crimes committed has since
increased, the protections afforded capital defendants against
the dangers of prejudicial publicity remain largely ineffective.
The battle between the First Amendment's "freedom of the
press"2 provision and the Sixth Amendment's "fair trial"' provi-
sion continues to wage.4 The numerous Supreme Court cases on
the topic have left trial judges with too much discretion to deny
protections from bias and publicity and not enough power to
* B.A. 1991, Villanova University, Villanova, Pennsylvania; J.D. 1994,
University of Notre Dame; Thos. J. White Scholar, 1992-94. I would like to
dedicate this article to the memory of my grandfather Dominick Mariniello,
who always believed in me. Also, I would like to thank the members of the
JOURNAL and Prof. John Robinson for their help and guidance.
1. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1878).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I, in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... "
3. Id. amend. VI, in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartialjury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed .
(emphasis added).
4. This article primarily concerns what types of judicial processes are
available to trial judges today to remedy the effects of prejudicial publicity. For
information on the ongoing conflict between the Sixth Amendment and the
First Amendment in the "free press" - "fair trial" context see AMERICAN SOCIETY
OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS, FREE PRESS & FAIR TRIAL (1987); DONALD M. GILMORE,
FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL (1966); PETER E. KANE, MURDER, COURTS, AND THE
PRESS (1992); REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY TASK FORCE ON JUSTICE,
PUBLICITY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT, RIGHTS IN CONFLICT (1976); FRED S.
SIEBERT ET AL., FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL (1970).
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grant the proper relief 5 There are questions left unanswered
and the current standards provide for ineffective protection for a
defendant's right to life guaranteed by the Constitution. This
battle's casualties are capital defendants, fighting for their lives,
and trial and appellate courts, left with the burden of entertain-
ing endless appeals based fundamentally on prejudicial pre-trial
publicity and abuse of discretion when entertaining pretrial
motions.
The potential for pretrial publicity to affect a verdict cannot
be overlooked.6 Perhaps the most documented capital punish-
ment case in history was a case in which "pretrial" publicity led
directly to the death of the defendant. The death of Jesus Christ
nearly two thousand years ago could very well be attributed to the
overwhelming public opinion that he was guilty.7 While Jesus did
not enjoy the limited protections available to today's defendants,
his death shows the power of public opinion and its prejudicial
effect upon factfinders which the courts cannot ignore.
Today, capital defendants, literally fighting for their "right
to life," often appeal based on prejudicial pretrial publicity and
appellate courts must continually address these cases. Most
recently, the Supreme Court decided the case of Mu'min v. Vir-
ginia.' In that case, David Mu'min was convicted and sentenced
to death for killing a woman in Prince William County, Virginia.
Eight of the twelve jurors who convicted Mu'min admitted to
5. See Mu'min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991); Gentile v. State Bar of
Nevada, 111 S.Ct. 2720 (1991); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984); Nebraska
Free Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794
(1975); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373
U.S. 723 (1963); Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962); Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717 (1961); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
For a good discussion of these and other important Supreme Court Cases
see DOUGLAS S. CAMPBELL, FREE PRESS v. FAIR TRiL: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
SINCE 1807 (Praeger 1994).
6. The Supreme Court recognized over one hundred years ago that
pretrial publicity can effect a trial's fairness. See generally Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
7. St. Matthew 27:15-23. ("Now at festival time the procurator used to
release to the crowd a prisoner, whomever they would. Now he had at that time
a notorious prisoner called Barabbas. Therefore, when they had gathered
together, Pilate said, 'Whom do you wish I release to you? Barabbas or Jesus
who is called Christ?' For he knew that they had delivered him up out of envy
... The chief priests and the elders persuaded the crowds to ask for Barabbas
and to destroy Jesus. But the procurator addressed them, and said to them
'Which of the two do you wish that I release to you?' And they said, 'Barabbas.'
Pilate said to them, 'What then am I to do withJesus who is called Christ?' They
all said, 'Let him be crucified!' The procurator said to them, 'Why, what evil has
he done?' But they kept crying out the more, saying, 'Crucify him!').
8. 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991).
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being exposed to the case in one way or another. Three months
prior to trial, Mu'min submitted, in support of his change of
venue motion, forty-seven newspaper articles discussing the mur-
der as well as information about Mu'min's criminal record, his
failure to gain parole six times, alleged prison infractions and
details about the murder for which Mu'min was already serving
time.9 The trial court denied Mu'min's motion for change of
venue and motion for individual voir dire. The United States
Supreme Court, upholding the earlier decision of the Virginia
Supreme Court, determined that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not require that prospective jurors
be screened about the specific content of the pre-trial publicity
they have been exposed to during voir dire. a" In so doing, the
Supreme Court affirmed Mu'min's conviction and death
sentence.
The Mu'min decision, along with other modern Supreme
Court decisions, have left trial courts guessing as to whether or
not pretrial publicity will affect the jury's decisions. "Given the
pervasiveness of modern communications and the difficulty of
effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of jurors . . ." the
court stated in Sheppard v. Maxwell,"a ". . . the trial courts must
take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed
against the accused."' 2
With the media attention given to high-profile cases, "the
main question centers around the conduct of the trial judge
toward the prospective and chosen jurors, in taking precautions
against the effect of publicity."' 3 If this is true, trial court judges
must minimize the role pre-trial publicity plays in the capital
cases. In what ways can judges do so? The more common reme-
dies available to judges such as change of venue, continuances,
sequestration, gag orders,jury voir dire, and jury instructions, are
generally ineffective. Moreover, all too frequently judges are
reluctant to issue them. 4
9. Id. at 1911; Among the various newspaper articles were articles with
headlines reading: Murderer Confesses to Killing Woman; Inmate Said to Admit to
Killing" Accused Killer Says He Stabbed Dale City Woman After Argument; Mu'min Says
He Decided Against Raping Nopwasky. Id.
10. Id. at 1908.
11. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
12. Id. at 362.
13. Margoles v. United States, 407 F.2d 727 (7th Cir. 1969).
14. Studies of jury behavior are divided as to whether jurors pre-exposed
to information of a murder can put aside what they have heard and form an
opinion based merely on what they hear during the trial. These studies will be
referred to throughout this paper.
1994]
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Where, then, does this leave us today? This article will
demonstrate that: 1) the remedies available to judges are ineffec-
tive and under-utilized; 2) the standards set by the Supreme
Court's decisions on pre-trial publicity related motions are inef-
fective; and, 3) most importantly, capital defendants should be
afforded greater protection. It will show how both proponents
and opponents of the death penalty would benefit from greater
pre-trial protections for capital defendants.
I. WiY TODAY'S JUDICIAL REMEDIES PROTECTING AGAINST JUROR
BIAS ARE INEFFECTIVE
In this media-dominated age, the remedies trial judges have
at their disposal to rid juries of bias are often not enough to pro-
tect defendants from the prejudicial effect of pretrial publicity.
Moreover, studies have found that the reluctance of trial judges
to use the available mechanisms and to rely on voir dire, jury
instructions, and deliberations to rid jury biases is inappropriate
and ineffective. 5 These studies have also found that jurors with
greater knowledge of a case are more likely to be pro-prosecu-
tion." The source of information for the media is generally
either the police or the prosecution, which is why newspapers
tend to report the prosecution's side of the case rather than the
defendant's.' 7 This, combined with the recent finding that death
penalty qualified jurors are conviction prone to begin with, is
very troubling.' The media and the judiciary have made
attempts at cooperation with regard to the reporting of criminal
cases; however, the competition to sell papers or to attract televi-
sion audiences often renders these agreements futile. 9
15. Geoffrey P. Kramer et al., Pretrial Publicity, Judicial Remedies, and Jury
Bias, 14 L. & HuM. BEHAv. 409 (1990).
16. Id. at 411.
17. John S. Carroll et al., Free Press and Fair Trial: The Role of Behavioral
Research, 10 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 187, 190 (1986).
18. See Frank P. Williams III & Marilyn D. McShane, Psychological Testimony
and the Decisions of Prospective Death-Qualified Jurors, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA: CuRRENT RESEARCH 71, 72 (Robert M. Bohm ed., 1991). This study
continued research on the effect of psychological testimony on juries in death
penalty cases. The study contrasted the effect of such testimony on "death-
penalty excludables" (defined as those potential jurors opposed to capital
punishment to the extent that their feelings interfere with their ability to grant
a death sentence and are thus excluded from jury service on death penalty
cases) and those "death-qualified" (defined as jurors willing to consider the
death penalty should the defendant be convicted). The study concluded that
death-qualified jurors are predisposed to favor the prosecution. Id. at 92-97.
19. See Carroll et al., supra note 17.
THE DEATH PENALTY AND PRE-TRIAL PUBLICITY
When should the remedial mechanisms available be used?
Why aren't they used more often? These are important questions
when the defendant is facing the death penalty. The reluctance
of appellate courts to overturn cases on the basis of pre-trial pub-
licity combined with the trial court's denial of pre-trial publicity
related motions makes the application of such mechanisms
much more critical when a person's life is at stake.
The remedies available today for judges to ensure that ajury
is as unbiased as possible include continuances, sequestration of
the jury, change of venue, jury voir dire, instruction, delibera-
tion, and gag orders on participants.2" Each of these remedies is
under-used, and in many cases insufficient to guarantee a fair
trial even when issued.
A. Continuances
One of the more effective ways of decreasing pretrial bias is
to diminish the effect of publicity through the use of continu-
ances. A continuance is simply an order postponing the trial to a
later date. Studies have shown that a continuance can be an
effective remedy to reduce the effect of publicity. 21
There are two reasons, in particular, why continuances are
not used more often. First, a judge grants a continuance upon
his or her discretion. The general theory behind issuing a contin-
uance is that one should be granted when it will further the
cause of justice. Vesting the discretion to grant such a motion
with the trial judge is important; however, it is also problematic
because, in the appeal of such motions, appellate courts review
20. Sequestration of a jury is another protection against publicity that
judges use to ensure fair trials. However, sequestration protects against publicity
during trial, not bias formed from publicity before trial. Also many states have
enacted policies through legislation or the courts that provide for mandatory
sequestration in all capital cases. See Lowery v. State of Indiana, 434 N.E.2d 868
(1982), as an example of such a case. The case required juries to be
sequestered when the prosecutor files a specific instrument in accordance with
Ind. Code. 35-50-2-9(a), which states that the prosecutor intends to seek a death
sentence.
While this paper does not address in detail the effects of publicity on jurors
during trial, statutes such as the one in Indiana are good examples of situations
where capital defendants are afforded greater protection against publicity
simply because the defendant faces the death penalty.
21. See Kramer et al., supra note 15. Geoffrey Kramer's study divided
publicity into two different types: factual publicity (containing incriminating
information about the defendant); and emotional publicity (which contained
information likely to arouse negative emotions). This study determined that
"[a] continuance of several days between exposure to the publicity and trial
served as an effective remedy for the factual publicity, but not for the emotional
publicity." Id,
1994]
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the record to find an abuse of discretion,22 perhaps the toughest
standard of review for appellants to overcome.
A second ,reason for denying a motion to continue is
grounded in the Constitution itself. The Sixth Amendment pro-
vides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial."2' The delay caused by a
continuance, it is argued, is an abridgement of the accused's
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.24 This argument is eas-
ily refuted when the accused, for whom this provision is included
in the Constitution, is the party making the motion. Opponents
also argue that granting continuances does more to impede jus-
tice because continuances allow the memories of witnesses to
fade and increase the potential for lost evidence.25
All these arguments lose their luster when the issue is the
life or death of a person. The abuse of discretion standard leaves
defendants too much room for appeal and judges too much
room for denial. Continuing to use the abuse of discretion stan-
dard when reviewing motions to continue will produce two natu-
ral consequences. First, there will be continued injustice for
defendants, who must suffer through a trial in the media before
entering a courtroom. Second, the standard results in greater
economic burdens on the judicial system due to the countless
appeals brought by defendants who hope their case will show suf-
ficient abuse of discretion to warrant a new trial.
B. Change of Venue
Change of venue motions, above all others, are under-uti-
lized by trial judges. A change of venue allows a trial judge to
move the trial to another county where the publicity has not
been so great as to have tainted the jury pool.26-Change of venue,
like a continuance, is also granted at the discretion of the trial
court judge,27 and an appellate court will reverse only when the
trial court's ruling is clearly an abuse of discretion.2" Appealing
22. United States v. Fuller, No. 92-5390, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 27058, at
*11 (4th Cir. October 15, 1993) (per curiam).
23. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI (emphasis added).
24. Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who is an ImpartialJuror in an Age of
Mass Media?, 40 Am. U.L. REv. 631, 647-48 (1991).
25. Id. at 648.
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1988) (this allows judges to change trial sites "in
the interest of justice").
27. See United States v. Dickie, 775 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Alvarado, 647 F.2d 537, 539 (5th Cir. 1981) (a district court judge has
"broad discretion in determining whether transfer is warranted"); cf. FED. R.
CuM. P. 18 (venue); Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 to 3174 (1993).
28. Kersten v. United States, 161 F.2d. 337 (10th Cir. 1947).
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the denial of a motion to change venue presents the same
problems which arise when appealing a motion to continue. The
vague standard of review supports many appeals, yet allows for
few reversals. This causes inefficiency and injustice. There is also
a reluctance on the part of judges to admit that the defendant
cannot receive a fair trial in their jurisdictions. 9
In some cases today, merely moving a case out of the county
in which the crime was committed will not reduce prejudice aris-
ing from widespread media attention. However, some studies"°
show that a change of venue will, in many cases, lessen the
amount of prejudice considerably. These same studies conclude
that occupants of the county in which a crime was committed are
more likely to be pro-prosecution.3 1 In some instances the differ-
ence in bias from the county in which the crime was committed
and a neighboring county is large enough to substantially affect
the degree of "fairness" a defendant receives.3 2
Changing the venue can cause a Constitutional conflict as
well. The Sixth Amendment calls for a trial before a 'jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted."3 3 Again, the fact that the case involves the defendant's
right to life and to an impartial jury,34 as provided for in the Con-
stitution, should override any conflict within the Sixth Amend-
ment. Our society's value of justice would seem to mandate
changes of venue to ensure a fair trial, but it often appears the
opposite.
Among the many Supreme Court cases addressing change of
venue "standards," for lack of a better word, is Irvin v Dowd.3 5 In
Irvin, the court stated:
It is not required that the jurors be totally ignorant of the
facts and issues involved. In these days of swift, widespread
and diverse methods of communication, an important case
can be expected to arouse the interest of the public in the
29. Minow & Cate, supra note 24, at 647.
30. These studies include: John B. McConahay, et al. The Uses of Social
Science in Trials with Political Overtones, 41 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205 (1977); A.
Pollack, The Use of Public Opinion Polls to Obtain Changes of Venue and Continuances
in Criminal Trials, 1 CRIM.JusT.J. 269 (1977); S.G. Riley, Pretrial Publicity: A Field
Study, 50JouRN. Q. 17; (1973) Neil Vidmar &John W.T.Judson, The Use of Social
Science in a Change of Venue Application. 59 CAN. BAR REV. 76 (1981).
31. Carroll et al., supra note 17, at 191.
32. Id. Professor Carroll's article reports one example where "two-thirds
of the venue county knew about a previous conviction of the defendant's but
only 2% knew in a county preferred by the defense."
33. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
34. Id.
35. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
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vicinity, and scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as
jurors will not have formed some impression or opinion as
to the merits of the case. This is particularly true in crimi-
nal cases. To hold that the mere existence of any precon-
ceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused,
without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a
juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible
standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his
impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the
evidence presented in court.3 6
This standard allows for a judge to deny a motion for change of
venue despite the existence of preconceived notions of guilt held by
jurors sitting on the case. The court states that to hold otherwise
is "to establish an impossible standard." 7 It is this standard soci-
ety must require when a case involves the possible death of the
defendant.
The Court next addressed the standard for granting change
of venue in Sheppard v. Maxwell.38 In Sheppard, the Court deter-
mined that a trial judge should grant a defendant's change of
venue motion upon a showing that there is a "reasonable likeli-
hood" that juror prejudice will prevent a fair trial.3 9 This stan-
dard became increasingly more difficult to attain with the
Court's decisions in Murphy v. Florida4 ° and Patton v. Yount.4 1 In
Murphy and Patton, the Court adopted a standard more easily
classified as "substantial likelihood" of prejudice rather than "rea-
sonable likelihood."
42
In McReynolds v. State of Indiana,4 3 the trial court denied a
change of venue motion despite what they admitted was a "sub-
stantial amount of publicity."" The record included evidence
36. Id, at 722-23 (emphasis added).
37. 1&
38. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
39. Id. at 363.
40. 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
41. 467 U.S. 1025 (1984).
42. The ABA itself has addressed the requisite standard in its Standards
for Criminal Justice. The 1980 revision of the Standards for Criminal Justice
adopt a "substantial likelihood of prejudice" standard for the granting of
change of venue motions as well as continuance motions:
A motion for change of venue or continuance will be granted
whenever it is determined that, because of the dissemination of
potentially prejudicial material, there is a substantial likelihood that,
in the absence of such relief, a fair and impartial jury cannot be had.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 8-3.3 (2d ed. 1980).
43. McReynolds v. State of Indiana, 460 N.E.2d 960 (Ind. 1984).
44. Id. at 961.
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that prior to voir dire at least twenty-four newspaper articles were
printed about the murder, the accused, and a related murder in
which the accused was the prime suspect.45 In addition, several
radio and television reports were broadcast about the murder.46
The court further admitted that, consistent with Irvin, "during
voir dire, all those eventually serving as jurors stated they
remembered hearing something about the incident."47 While the
record contains no statistics regarding the knowledge of poten-
tial jurors outside the county in which the case was heard, it can
be inferred from the defendant's requested motion that there
was less potential prejudice in neighboring counties. Neverthe-
less, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld the trial court's denial
of this motion.48
Change of venue also can be supported by those who argue
that other options are poor ways of ridding juries of bias, insofar
as these options strip juries of intelligent, informed citizens. The
argument works on two assumptions about our society: 1) that
"good" citizens care about the crime and prevention of crime
going on around them; and 2) citizens who don't know about
crimes reported by the media are "bad" citizens and thus "bad"
jurors. If, then, all informed jurors are stripped from juries in
capital cases, only the ignorant will remain. The argument con-
cludes from the foregoing that no good citizens will serve as
jurors in capital cases. Surely this conclusion presents a situation
all those concerned with justice wish to avoid. While there are
flaws in the argument's reasoning, the reasoning is rebuffed
when the cure for bias is change of venue. Change of venue is a
convenient way to eliminate bias and still have informed, intelli-
gent citizens from whom to select a jury.
C. Jury Voir Dire, Instruction, & Deliberation
The standards established by the Supreme Court allow
jurors to sit even if they have been exposed to substantial media
reports of the case so long as they can state, as honestly as possi-
ble, that any predisposition of guilt or innocence will be set aside
during the trial.49 What then is required of the trial judge when






49. 366 U.S. at 722-23.
1994]
380 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 8
1. Voir Dire
Extensive jury voir dire is the most commonly used
approach for determining juror bias.5 ° However, the determina-
tion of what is actually extensive voir dire is determined by the
trial judge on a case by case basis and is subject to the "actual
prejudice" standard.5 1 This standard presumes that the trial
judge sits in the best position to determine the amount of bias
and prejudice from local news coverage.5 2 The "actual preju-
dice" standard requires the defendant to prove prejudice against
a presumption of non-prejudice.5" This is an extremely difficult
task since defendants and their counsel have such limited access
to juror deliberations. This standard neither reduces the
amount of pretrial publicity nor the number of appeals. The voir
dire in Murphy v. Florida,5 4 a case in which the petitioner was con-
victed of robbery, exemplifies a typically permissive voir dire.
The fact that the case does not involve a capital offense does not
affect the standard applied, because the standard established in
Murphy applies to all voir dire examinations. An example of the
questions asked of venirepersons in Murphy follows:
Q. (defense attorney) Now, when you go into that jury
room and you decide upon Murphy's guilt or inno-
cence, you are going to take into account the fact that
he is a convicted murderer; aren't you?
A. (potential juror) Not if we are listening to the case, I
wouldn't.
Q. But you know about it?
A. How can you not know about it?
Q. When you go into the jury room, the fact that he is a
convicted murderer, that is going to influence your ver-
dict; is it not?
A. We are not trying him for murder.
Q. The fact that he is a convicted murderer and jewel
thief, that would influence your verdict?
A. I didn't know he was a jewel thief.
Q. Oh. I am sorry to put words in your mouth.
Now sir, after two or three weeks of being locked up in
a downtown motel, as the court determines, and after hear-
ing the State's case, and after hearing no case on behalf of
Murphy, and hearing no testimony from Murphy saying, 'I
50. Kramer et al., supra note 15, at 413.
51. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 803 (1975).
52. Mu'min, 111 S.Ct. at 1906.
53. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, at 799-803.
54. 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
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am innocent' - when you go into the jury room, sir, all
these facts are going to influence your verdict?
A. I imagine it would be.
Q. And in fact, you are saying if Murphy didn't testify, and
if he doesn't offer evidence, 'My experience of him is
such that right now I would find him guilty.'
A. I believe so.5
5
This examination smacks in the face of two fundamental princi-
ples of American justice: that criminal guilt be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, and, that a defendant is innocent until proven
guilty. Therein lies the difference between burden of proof and
presumption of innocence as theories and their practical applica-
tions in an age of pervasive media coverage.
The jury system relies on the presumption that venireper-
sons are honest and candid before the court. 56 However, studies
indicate that voir dire is ineffective in ridding the jury of bias.57
Jurors tend not to speak out during voir dire. It is not uncom-
mon for jurors to lie so as to disguise their prejudices and
preconceptions.58
55. Id. at 802 n.5.
56. While jurors generally have good intentions, it has been found that
jurors may not always have the ability to recognize their prejudices. See JEFFREY
T. FREDERICK, The Psychology of the American Jury 27 (1987), in which the author
notes:
A study specifically addressing the question of whether jurors
recognize their own biases indicates that jurors are generally unaware
of their own prejudices. Only 26% of those exposed to damaging
pretrial publicity recognized their biases, while the remaining
supposedly "neutral" jurors who were exposed to damaging pretrial
publicity still convicted the defendant at a 2-to-i rate as compared to
jurors not exposed to such publicity.
Id. (citing Stanley Sue et al., Authoritarianism, Pretrial Publicity, and Awareness of
Bias in Simulated jurors, 37 PSYCHOL. REP. 1299 (1975)).
57. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 205, 206 (1989); see also NATIONALJURY PROJECT: SYSTEMATic TECHNIQUES
§ 2.03 (2d ed. 1991). Most jurors portray themselves as honest and fair.
However, jurors tend to give way to what is termed evaluation apprehension,
defined as a concern for the way their performance is evaluated. This leads to a
awareness of the consequences of their answers to an attorneys questions in voir
dire. Id. at § 2.03[2]. This awareness is aggravated by the social status of the
interviewer. In other words, the status of the interviewer as judge or attorney
may heighten the apprehension the juror feels. Id. at § 2.03[3]. This pressure,
along with a "person's natural reaction to stress, embarrassment, group
pressure, and public exposure" affects juror responses during voir dire. Id. at
§ 2.03[2]. These influences leave the juror's responses less reliable despite his or
her honest and fair intentions.
58. Minow & Cate, supra note 24, at 650-51.
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It is, therefore, imperative that lawyers and judges ask the
right questions to bring out these biases if we are to rely on voir
dire to combat the effects of pretrial publicity. "Even when the
judge or attorneys wish to ask the right questions, they find that
voir dire questions are difficult to frame . . .," says Newton
Minow, "[j]urors often do not understand what information is
prejudicial or improper or know that they possess such informa-
tion. In fact the very act of questioning about bias may induce a
counter bias."5 9
In 1991, the Supreme Court permitted substantial limita-
tions on the amount and content of voir dire into a jurors expo-
sure to pre-trial publicity in Mu'min v. Virginia.6" In Mu'min, the
Court addressed the issue of whether the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment requires the trial judge to ask or
allow questions to potential jurors regarding their knowledge
about the case as a result of pre-trial publicity.6 ' Over a strong
dissent by Justice Marshall, the Court held that a trial court is not
required to allow questions concerning the specific content of
the pre-trial publicity to which venirepersons have been exposed.
It permitted the questioning to be limited to the venirepersons
ability to remain impartial.6 2 The dissent in Mu'min concluded
that such a ruling leaves the Sixth's Amendments guarantee of a
fair trial as a mere "hollow formality."63
What difference does this really make to those facing execu-
tion? The difference between life and death. The Irvin standard,
59. Id. at 652-53.
60. 111 S.Ct. 1899 (1991).
61. Id. at 1901.
62. Id. at 1903. It should be noted that several state courts have held that
such questions are permissible to assess juror bias. The Mu'min decision only
determines that such questions are not constitutionally compelled under the
U.S. Constitution. See Tennessee v. Claybrook, 736 S.W.2d 95 (Tenn. 1987);
New Jersey v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45 (1987); Illinois v. Taylor, 101 I11. 2d 377 (1984);
Hawaii v. Pokini, 55 Haw. 640 (1974).
It should also be noted that the courts in Tennessee v. Claybrook and New
Jersey v. Bey discussed and gave great weight to the fact that the defendants were
sentenced to death in their original trials.
63. Id. at 1909 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, who joined
Justice Marshall on the dissent, voiced his opinion on the extent to which a trial
judge should inquire into exposure to publicity in Nebraska Free Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976):
[A] judge should broadly explore such matters as the extent to which
prospective jurors had read particular news accounts or whether they
had heard about incriminating data such as an alleged confession or
statements by purportedly reliable sources concerning the defendant's
guilt.
427 U.S. 539 at 602.
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allowing jurors who have preconceived notions of guilt to sit, is
very dangerous. Studies indicate that jurors admitting some
degree of bias are more likely to convict than those who are
unbiased.64
Clearly, voir dire is an improper place for judges to expect
jury bias to be eliminated, not only because of the reluctance of
jurors to admit bias, but also because of the inability of judges
and attorneys to show bias during voir dire.65 The tendency on
the part ofjudges and attorneys to rush through voir dire so as to
continue along with the trial, along with the difficulty of framing
questions likely to elicit bias, makes voir dire unreliable as protec-
tion against bias.66
2. Jury Instructions
The second remedy that judges use during the trial process
to diminish the effects of publicity is jury instructions. Judicial
instructions ask jurors to disregard inadmissible evidence or
notice of prior criminal record of the defendant. In reality, they
do little to reduce bias and are largely ignored.67 A recent study
published determined that judicial instructions asking jurors to
decide only on the facts heard at trial had no effect on jury ver-
dicts.68 The conclusion was that "reliance upon standard cau-
tionary instructions as a remedy for prejudicial pre-trial publicity
appears to be unwarranted."69
3. Deliberation
Lastly, some judges rely on the deliberation process to elimi-
nate bias from pre-trial publicity. Studies differ on the effects of
pre-trial publicity on the quality and content of deliberation.7 °
There is a large body of research, however, concluding that
group discussion tends to polarize individual viewpoints and that
a small amount of publicity-induced bias can magnify in group
64. Kramer et al., supra note 15, at 413.
65. Minow & Cate, supra note 24, at 651-53.
66. Id. at 653.
67. Kramer et al., supra note 15, at 412; see also Minow & Cate, supra note
24, at 647, which refers to a study by Hans & Doob of simulated juries. The
study concluded that, despite instructions to the contrary, jurors considered
inadmissible information in their deliberations. 18 CRM. L. Q. 235, 240, 249
(1976).
68. Kramer et al., supra note 15, at 430; This study determined that, in
fact, instructions were counter productive, actually strengthening the impact of
factual publicity.
69. Id.
70. Kramer et al., supra note 15, at 413; see also Minow & Cate, supra note
24, at 649.
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deliberation."' This suggests that deliberation is yet another pro-
cess that is inherently unreliable. The differing studies provide
for interesting reading, but offer few definitive conclusions. The
only conclusion that can be made from the examinations is that,
in instances where execution is the penalty, responsible judges
should not rely on deliberations to diminish the effects of pre-
trial publicity.
A fair and just society can conclude from the large body of
studies done on jury voir dire, instruction, and deliberation only
that the present attempts to negate jury bias arising from pre-trial
publicity are ineffective, especially in highly publicized capital
cases. Circuit Court Judge Calvert Magruder said:
One cannot assume that the average juror is so endowed
with a sense of detachment, so clear in his introspective
perception of his own mental processes, that he may confi-
dently exclude even the unconscious influence of his
preconceptions as to probable guilt, engendered by perva-
sive pre-trial publicity. 72
One would think that, in the face of such clear evidence, the use
of other, more effective remedies, such as change of venue and
continuances, would be employed. However, this is not the cur-
rent situation. Jury voir dire, deliberations, and instructions are
still the remedies which judges rely upon most when attempting
to combat pre-trial jury bias, even in death penalty cases. 73
D. Gag Orders
A judicial directive to all parties to abstain from discussing
the case in public, commonly called a "gag order," is another
method used to dilute the affects of pre-trial publicity. Nowhere
is the battle between the First Amendment and the Sixth Amend-
ment more evident then in issuance of gag orders on parties to
trials. ChiefJustice Rehnquist recognized this conflict in Gentile v.
State Bar of Nevada."4 Rehnquist stated, "Few, if any, interests
under the Constitution are more fundamental than the right to a
fair trial by impartial jurors, and an outcome affected by extraju-
dicial statements would violate that fundamental right."7" This
remedy directly confronts the First Amendment's free speech
provision and is subject to constitutional attack from both the
71. Kramer et al., supra note 15, at 413.
72. Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 112-13 (1st Cir. 1952).
73. Kramer et al., supra note 15, at 409-11.
74. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. 2720.
75. Id. at 2745.
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prosecutor and the defendant as a prior restraint on speech.76
The First Amendment is guarded as if it was the crown jewel of
the Constitution and thus any judicial order limiting the content
of speech will be subject to the strictest scrutiny. However, it is
evident that the majority of post-arrest publicity comes out of the
office of the prosecutor.77 If, then, the amount of information
released by the prosecutor's office was diminished by court
order, there would be less prejudicial information for the press
to publish.
"Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, wit-
nesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under the
jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its func-
tion. .. " stated the court in Sheppard v. Maxwell,7" "Collaboration
between counsel and the press as to information affecting the
fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation but is
highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures."79
Despite this apparent endorsement of so called "gag orders"
judges are unlikely to issue them. This is primarily because their
issuance presents three problems. First, there are the over-
whelming constitutional questions regarding the restraint on
speech. Second, the enforcement of such orders against the par-
ties to the trial is a difficult task. Finally, judges are reluctant to
issue gag orders because some of the more prejudicial informa-
tion given to the press does not always come from parties under
the control of the court."0
Many defense attorneys feel that such gag orders are more
frequently enforced upon defense attorneys than upon prosecu-
tors.81 Yet, it appears that defense attorneys often knowingly and
directly violate these orders to counter the unprosecuted leaks to
the press coming from the prosecutor's office. "We live in an era
where there are tremendous amounts of leaks to the press ... ,"
states Frederick Hafetz,82 "[t] here is also a huge amount of infor-
76. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
77. Carroll et al., supra note 17, at 190.
78. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
79. Id. at 362-363.
80. "It is apparent that neither the Supreme Court, not any legislature
can shut off access to all the legitimate sources of information without revoking
the freedom of speech of friends, neighbors, fellow employees, teachers, wives,
(etc.).. " HowARD FLESHER, JUSTICE U.S.A.? 10 (1967).
81. Andrew Blum, Left Speechless, Out of Court Defense Lauyers Feel a Chilling
Breeze, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 18, 1993, at 1, 26, 27.
82. Id. at 26; Mr. Hafetz is a partner at New York's Goldman & Hafetz and
is currently representing Mr. Bruce Cutler against accusations that he violated a
court order by speaking to the press while representing mob boss John Gotti in
a well publicized case.
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mation reported in a way that prejudices defendants, so defense
lawyers feel a need to talk to the media." 3 This was precisely the
case in the recent Supreme Court case Gentile v. State Bar of
Nevada"4 . In Gentile, the Supreme Court reversed a decision by
the Nevada Supreme Court to disbar a defense attorney for state-
ments he made purposely to combat the publicity against his cli-
ent disseminated from the prosecutor's office. The attorney
explained that he made his statements due to his concern that
"... unless some of the weaknesses in the State's case were made
public, a potentialjury venire would be poisoned by repetition in
the press of information being released by the police and
prosecutors. 8 5
Gentile illustrates the problems attorneys have in complying
with local guidelines. In Gentile, the defense attorney had not
violated a court order but rather Nevada Supreme Court Rule
177 through comments issued during a press conference. The
rule, modeled after the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, is violated when an attorney makes statements prior to trial
that have a "substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an
adjudicative proceeding." 6 While most state bars have rules simi-
lar to Nevada's, some states provide less protection for attorney
speech by applying a "reasonable likelihood of prejudice" stan-
dard.17 The rules promulgated can only guide attorneys to a lim-
ited extent. In fact, the comments to the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct themselves admit "[n]o body of rules can
simultaneously satisfy all interests of fair trial and all those of free
expression.""
If it is difficult to gag the parties, why then not silence the
press? Again Constitutional issues guard against such orders.
83. Id.
84. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
85. Id. at 2728.
86. Id. at 2737. The Nevada rule is substantially similar to the MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6. The Rule states in part:
Rule 3.6 Trial Publicity
(a) A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a
reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of
public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know
that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an
adjudicative proceeding.
Part (b) provides a partial list of what types of comments will be considered to
be violative of the rule. Part (c) provides a list of what types of comments are
not violative of the rule. Neither list is considered exhaustive, only illustrative.
87. This standard is developed from the CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
REsPONSIBILrrY DR 7-107. It has been adopted in some form in eleven states as
of the decision in Gentile. 111 S. Ct. at 2741.
88. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 cmt. (1992).
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Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart9 effectively eliminates the option of
gagging the press. In Stuart, the defendant was accused of the
murder of six members of a family in their home in Sutherland,
Nebraska. At that time, the town wherein the murders had been
committed had only 850 residents. The trial court issued an
order prohibiting those in attendance at court hearings and such
from "releasing or authorizing the release for public dissemina-
tion in any form or manner whatsoever any testimony given or
evidence adduced."9" The motion for restrictive order had been
brought by both the defendant and the County Attorney, recog-
nizing the difficulty in finding an impartial jury in such a small
community.9'
The Supreme Court did not explicitly hold, in Stuart, that
trial court orders can never gag the press from reporting events.
Rather, the Court said that, under the facts of that particular
case, it was not proper to gag the press, but that there may be
instances where it would be tolerable.92 However, if the facts sur-
rounding the trial in Stuart did not merit an order gagging the
press, then it is difficult to envision when such an order would be
justified on the basis of pretrial publicity. In essence, prior
restraint of the press is simply unacceptable to the courts.9"
The result in Stuart cannot be overlooked as insignificant.
When faced with a direct confrontation between the First and
Sixth Amendments, the Court decided in favor of protecting
speech over protecting the integrity of trials. Whether one
believes this case to be correctly decided is largely irrelevant,
since that decision is likely to be based on how one personally
feels about the battle between the two Constitutional provisions.
However, what is most relevant about the impact of Stuart on
future cases is the precedent the case sets regarding which of the
two competing Constitutional provisions the Court favors. The
true effect of Stuart cannot be measured in numbers, but is cer-
89. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
90. Id. at 542.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 569-70; Mr. Chief Justice Burger writing for the court stated,
"However difficult it may be, we need not rule out the possibility of showing the
kind of threat to fair trial rights that would possess the requisite degree of
certainty to justify restraint. This Court has frequently denied that First
Amendment rights are absolute and has consistently rejected the proposition
that a prior restraint can never be employed." Id.
93. Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968); Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); 393 U.S. 175, 181 ("Any prior restraint on
expression comes to this Court with a 'heavy presumption' against its
Constitutional validity").
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tainly felt each time an inflammatory media story is broadcast or
printed.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S RESPONSE TO THE GROWING
PROBLEM
So where does this leave today's capital defendants? Contin-
uances, changes of venue, sequestration of juries, jury voir dire,
deliberation, instructions and gag orders are all for one reason
or another either denied, inappropriate or ineffective. Do capital
defendants "deserve" greater protection? After all, the crimes
these defendants are accused of are usually the most heinous
crimes our system encounters. Would more judicious use of the
existing remedies lead to greater justice? To find the answer we
must look beyond each individual defendant to the overall effect
of capital punishment on our society.
Despite society's general acceptance of capital punishment
as a punishment for the guilty, the history of death penalty cases
show a Supreme Court that has wrestled with the moral and soci-
etal impact the death penalty imparts.94 The great objection to
the death penalty is the idea that execution is violative of the
"cruel and unusual punishment" clause of the Eighth Amend-
ment.9" This argument concerns the idea that our society has a
conscience and will not tolerate "cruel and unusual" penalties.
The arguments presented in this article are simply extensions of
that conscience. Simply stated, because of the intense media cov-
erage of death penalty cases, which causes the increased expo-
sure of venirepersons to the publicity, greater protections should
be afforded to capital defendants whose "right to life" is at stake.
A society that rules with a conscience should mandate such
protections.
A. The Importance of Having our Trial Verdicts Based on Evidence
Heard at Trial
What remains a concern throughout any discussion of the
effects of prejudicial publicity is, how can we control juries so
that the decisions they render will be based on only the informa-
tion they hear at trial? The studies suggest that trial court reli-
ance on voir dire, instruction, and deliberation to control
prejudicial publicity is misplaced. However negative the studies
94. Throughout the modem history of death penalty cases, Justice
Marshall and Justice Brennan addressed these issues beginning with their
opinions in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
95. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
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are regarding the effectiveness of today's mechanisms to control
pre-trial publicity, the procedures can be useful tools to elimi-
nate bias if used less arbitrarily. 6 The Supreme Court has not
been helpful as it has set up standards that leave trial judges few
clear guidelines when determining the levels of excessive public-
ity. Mr. Justice Clark wrote that:
England, from whom the Western World has largely taken
the concepts of individual liberty and of the dignity and
worth of every man, has bequeathed to us safeguards for
their preservation, the most priceless of which is that of
trial byjury. This right has become as much American as it
was once the most English. In essence, the right to jury
trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a
panel of impartial, "indifferent'jurors. The failure to accord
an accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal stan-
dards of process.9 7
The juries in capital cases have the power to strip defendants not
only of their liberty but also of their lives. The importance of this
cannot be overlooked as insignificant. Justice Clark echoed the
sentiments of previous courts when he stated that an accused
criminal's guilt or innocence must be based solely on the evi-
dence presented at trial.98 "The theory of the law is that a juror
who has formed an opinion cannot be impartial."
99
B. Standards of Review of Pretrial Publicity Motions
The vague standards which "guide" trial court judges have
led to several different, and equally vague standards of appellate
review of pre-trial publicity based motions. The first standard
established for appellate courts when reviewing pre-trial publicity
motions was established in Reynolds v. United States.a°° In Reynolds,
the defendant, charged with bigamy, complained when several
jurors acknowledged that they formed an opinion about the case
from reading newspaper articles before being impanelled. Reyn-
olds established that a trial court's finding should not be set aside
unless the "error is manifest."' ' ' The Court later, in Sheppard,10 2
96. Justice Clark wrote in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 that
"[r]eversals are just palliative; the cure lies in those remedial measures that will
prevent prejudice at its inception. The courts must take such steps by rule and
regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside
interference."
97. 366 U.S. 717, 721-22 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 722.
99. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155 (1878).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 156.
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reduced the requisite standard to a showing of "reasonable likeli-
hood" of prejudice. This standard essentially requires identifi-
able prejudice to the accused need not be proven by a convicted
defendant seeking reversal of his or her conviction if the totality
of the circumstances raises the probability of prejudice."° Jus-
tice Clark, writing for the Court stated: "[W] here there is a rea-
sonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent
a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat
abates, or move it to another county not so permeated with pub-
licity." 104 However, the Court changed its mind only ten years
later in Murphy v. Florida, stating that defendants must show
either "inherent prejudice" or "actual prejudice" in order to
show abuse of discretion. 10 5
The concept of "inherent prejudice" was first developed in
Estes v. Texas.10 6 This concept presumes prejudice to the defend-
ant when the courtroom is essentially turned into a media circus.
In Estes, the courtroom was transformed into a broadcast center.
The courtroom was overrun with cameras, wires, and other
media equipment. 0 7 The trial judge and other court personnel
were harassed by the interference the media caused. 10 8 In fact,
the media coverage was so extensive that, at one point, thejudge
continued the case for a month so that a booth could be con-
structed to confine the media inside the courtroom.' 9 As if this
was not enough, the court allowed the entire pre-trial hearing
and much of the trial itself to be televised live to the commu-
nity.1 10 The Supreme Court determined in Estes that this type of
atmosphere denies the defendant due process and is inherently
prejudicial.1 '
While the Court has not since had occasion to consider simi-
lar situations, the circus-like atmosphere surrounding trials such
as that in Estes has been significantly controlled. The courts have
found better ways of dealing with television interference since
1965, when Estes was decided. Court orders and agreements with
the media have led to less chaotic courtrooms.
102. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
103. Id. at 352-55.
104. Id. at 363.
105. 421 U.S. 794, 803 (1975).
106. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
107. Id. at 536.
108. Id. at 551.
109. Id, at 537.
110. Id. at 535-38.
111. Id. at 550-53.
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The second way of showing abuse of discretion is by demon-
strating "actual prejudice.""' To do so, one must show that the
circumstances surrounding the voir dire and trial permit an
inference of actual prejudice.' As one would assume, this is a
difficult standard to meet. Nevertheless, because "inherent" prej-
udice is already being addressed and combatted by the courts,
"actual" prejudice, as developed in Murphy, has become a com-
mon defendant's attack, most of which are unsuccessful.
The pendulum-like swaying of the Court with regard to the
standard required to show prejudice does nothing to advance a
trial judge's decision whether to accept a juror or excuse him or
her based on preconceived notions. Changing the standard
leaves defendants hopeful that a court will find their case to be
the type which should be reversed and, therefore, encourages
numerous appeals. Also, what one judge deems prejudicial
another judge in the same jurisdiction may not. This leads to a
difference in the degree of protection against bias from one
courtroom to another.
Some critics argue that, for the sake of consistency in the
system, the level of "fairness" should be no different in capital
cases than in other criminal cases.11 4 Proponents of this argu-
ment note that it seems odd, or at least illogical, that those
accused of the most atrocious crimes should be afforded greater
protections. This argument fails to recognize, however, the fun-
damental difference between capital and other criminal trials.
Capital cases require greater due process protections because not
only is the accused's liberty at stake, but his or her life as well.
"With his life at stake, . . .," stated Justice Clark in Irvin, "... it is
not requiring too much that petitioner be tried in an atmosphere
undisturbed by so huge a wave of public passion and by a jury
other than one in which.., members admit, before hearing testi-
mony, to possessing a belief in his guilt."' 15 It is clear from the
Court's opinion in Irvin, that the fact that the defendant was fac-
ing the death penalty did affect the Court's decision on the Con-
stitutional protections afforded the accused. 6 The fact that the
112. Murphy, 421 U.S. at 803.
113. Id.
114. This paper does not truly address the question of whether other
types of cases should be afforded similar protections, although the author
recognizes the applicability of this article to other cases, such as many rape
cases, where community rage and media attention can effect jury bias and no
capital penalty is inflicted.
115. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 728.
116. Id. at 727-28: "Where one's life is at stake - and accounting for the
frailties of human nature - we can only say that in the light of the circumstances
here the finding of impartiality does not meet constitutional standards."
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defendants face the death penalty cannot be overlooked as insig-
nificant. It is this reality which led to the greater protections
granted by state supreme courts in Tennessee v. Claybrook1 7 and
New Jersey v. Bey.11s In both cases the fact that the defendant
faced the death penalty was a important factor driving the court
to grant greater due process protections. 9
III. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
To begin with, today's available remedies against pretrial
publicity induced bias need to be used more frequently. In order
to do this, the standard used by trial court judges to assess the
effect of that publicity must be more salient and easier to achieve
than the "actual prejudice" standard established in Murphy.12°
Demonstrating actual prejudice when counsel has little, if any,
access to the beliefs of jurors or their deliberations is virtually
impossible. Requiring that counsel show there was a "reasonable
likelihood" of prejudice is a preferable test, especially in the capi-
tal punishment context. If trial court judges understood that
their administration of a capital trial would be reviewed under
this more stringent standard, they would be significantly more
inclined than they are now to take action to protect against bias
when the totality of the circumstances suggest pretrial bias. The
defendant facing execution should be assured that his or her
trial will be as "fair" as is the trial of a defendant facing drug
possession charges whose case is never reported in the newspa-
per or on television. Today's standards for pretrial publicity
motions deny this "fairness."
A. "Death is different"
The idea that capital punishment cases should be and are
treated differently with regard to certain situations is not a new
117. 736 S.W.2d 95 (Tenn. 1987).
118. 112 N.J. 45 (1987).
119. In Claybrook the court, reviewing the denial of defense counsel's
motion to inquire into the prejudicial reports each juror had been exposed to,
stated: "This Court cannot sanction the denial of the procedure.., in a death
penalty case such as this; so-called curative instructions and admonitions to the
jurors who are subjected to prejudicial information . . . are not enough."
Tennessee v. Claybrook, 736 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tenn. 1987).
Similarly, in New Jersey v. Bey, the NewJersey Supreme Court reversed a trial
court's decision on the basis of potential exposure to prejudicial information
released through the media mid-trial. In doing so, the Court referred to its
decision in State v. Williams to emphasize the importance of heightened fair trial
requirements in death penalty cases. 112 N.J. 45, 92.
120. 421 U.S. 794, 803.
THE DEATH PENALTY AND PRE-TRIAL PUBLJCITY
concept. At the very outset of our current capital punishment
regime, the Court recognized that cases involving capital punish-
ment may be treated differently, procedurally speaking, than
other criminal cases.1" This is due primarily to the "uniqueness
of the death penalty."1 2 In Furman, the Court examined sentenc-
ing procedures and found them violative of the cruel and unu-
sual punishment clause.'2 3 Also, in Eddings v. Oklahoma," 4 the
Court continued its discussion of the use of mitigating factors
during the sentencing phase of capital trials.' 25 In Spiziano v.
Florida,'26 the Court required that fact-finding procedures in cap-
ital cases aspire to a higher standard of reliability.'2 7 These cases
reveal the Court's recognition of "a natural consequence of the
knowledge that execution is the most irremediable and
unfathomable of penalties; that death is different."'"28
However, the courts are not the only avenue in which death
has been treated differently. Procedurally speaking, some courts
and legislatures have taken measures specifically to protect
defendants in capital cases. Some states have successfully found
ways to reduce the adverse impact of publicity during trial
through mandatory sequestration of juries in capital cases.' 29 In
these instances, the courts, including the United States Supreme
Court, have seen a distinction between capital cases and others
recognizing that the defendant's right to life requires greater
protection. Perhaps the rationale accepted by the Court in the
mandatory sequestration context could be extended when con-
sidering otherjudicial remedies. All these examples suggest that
it is not unreasonable nor, practically. speaking, impossible for
courts and legislatures to make special rules to preserve the guar-
antee of a fair trial for those facing the death penalty.
121. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
122. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1975).
123. Furman, 408 U.S. at 314.
124. 455 U.S. 104 (1981).
125. See also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 ("the fundamental
respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires
consideration of the character and record of the individual defender and the
circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part
of the process of inflicting the penalty of death"); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978).
126. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
127. Id. at 456.
128. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1985).
129. See supra note 20.
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B. How Can the Methods Available Be Used More Effectively?
Continuances and changes of venue, if used more often,
would be the most effective remedies for reducing pretrial bias.
As things currently stand, however, they are granted at the discre-
tion of trial judges; this allows for an intolerable level of injustice
and inefficiency. A lesser showing than "actual prejudice" is nec-
essary in capital cases when reviewing change of venue and con-
tinuance motions."' 0 Courts should issue continuances and
changes of venue upon a showing that there is a reasonable like-
lihood of prejudice, when looking at the totality of the circum-
stances, so as to protect defendants facing death. If, in fact, the
granting of continuances and changes of venue motions were
mandatory upon a showing of "reasonable likelihood" of preju-
dice, as Sheppard required, the burden of proof would not be so
high as to lead to the denial of such motions in cases where a real
possibility of prejudicial information abounds.
With regard to jury voir dire, deliberations and instructions,
two realizations must occur. First, trial court judges must put real-
ity ahead of ego, and the fairness of the trial ahead of their own
wishes to preside over provocative cases. Judges must acknowl-
edge the studies showing that these methods rarely cure the jury
of bias. l"1 Misplaced reliance on these remedies only leads to
injustice. This is compounded by the fact that, on appeal from
the denial of such remedies, defendants are still held to the
"actual prejudice" standard of Murphy.
Second, voir dire practices which allow the admission of
jurors who have preconceived notions as to the guilt or inno-
cence of the defendant should be discontinued. Voir dire, such
as that in Murphy v. Florida,"3 2 where jurors admit to having
preconceived notions of guilt derived from pretrial publicity, is
simply too ineffective in capital punishment cases. However, one
wonders how defense attorneys are to determine bias when
courts are free to prohibit inquiry into a juror's exposure to pre-
trial publicity, as held in Mu'min.133 Our society, which places a
great value on justice, cannot continue to tolerate such abuses.
130. Some state courts have recognized the distinction between capital
cases and other criminal cases by discussing the obligation of appellate courts in
reviewing motions in death penalty cases. See New Jersey v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45
(1987). "We believe that in death penalty cases an appellate court must subject
the record to intense scrutiny. The stark fact that a litigant's life is at stake
intensifies the obligation of judicial review." Id. at 92-93.
131. Kramer et al., supra note 15, at 413; see also Minow & Cate, supra note
24, at 649.
132. 421 U.S. 794, 802 (1975).
133. 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1903 (1991).
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While the concept of "innocent until proven guilty" must be
applied in all criminal cases, it must be religiously adhered to in
cases where the State intends to execute the defendant upon
conviction. It is morally and ethically reproachable for courts
first to deny change of venue motions and continuances and
then to allow on a jury people who openly state that, based on
their current pretrial ideas, they would convict rather than acquit
a defendant. The fundamental precept of American justice, that
a defendant is innocent until proven guilty, requires precisely the
opposite. Given that either granting another remedy or impanel-
ing more venirepersons would provide simple methods of elimi-
nating the presence of "influenced" jurors, one or the other
should be mandatory.
The problems of gag orders will not go away. Leaks are
bound to continue despite judicial scrutiny. In order to avoid
the inequity of gag order enforcement, judges must patrol prose-
cutors as they do defense attorneys.1 34 Failure to do so may very
well lead to the purposeful violation of gag orders on the part of
defense attorneys simply to "balance" out the harmful publicity.
The press, furthermore, needs to be more discreet in what it
deems publishable and must remember that their communities
will eventually be called upon to decide the life or death of the
accused. While the press has made attempts at organized rules
for protecting defendants, these regulations must be more
closely adhered to. The regulations would be effective if they
were not abandoned every time a "hot" story came along. The
fact that there is no body to enforce these rules frequently ren-
ders them ineffective as well.
IV. CONCLUSION
What is called for is not an overhaul of the current system
but rather a greater commitment to the integrity of our court
system. Again, a reader of this article may validly ask, why should
we give those accused of the most heinous crimes in society the
benefit of greater protections? The obvious reasons abound for
opponents of the death penalty to support such change. Why,
however, should those favoring the imposition of the death pen-
alty to those so sentenced favor greater protections for the
accused? To find the answer one must look beyond the individ-
134. The ABA has appointed a committee to review the sanctions for
violations of Model Rule 3.6 on extrajudicial statements. Some of the proposed
revisions allow attorneys greater latitude when speaking to the press and others
make the provisions narrower. Blum, supra note 81, at 27.
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ual case to the greater effect such protections would have on the
judicial and penitentiary systems.
In cases where death is to be the punishment, courts should
return to the "reasonable likelihood" of prejudice standard as
applied in Sheppardi" 5 and Estes."36 Such a change would give
judges an easier standard to apply and would authorize granting
pretrial publicity motions on a showing of a likelihood of preju-
dice rather than actual prejudice. Today's "actual prejudice"
standard may require judges to deny motions when the defense
can not meet the actual prejudice standard, but where the judge
feels prejudice may influence the trial. A more salient standard
would allow appellate courts to take a closer look at trial court
decisions against granting a remedy, insofar as their review would
no longer be seeking actual prejudice but only the likelihood of
prejudice.
Proponents of the death penalty would likely support the
change in standard. Assuming that such proponents believe in
the constitutional idea of a "fair" trial, and do not wish to put to
death those whose trials were tainted by biased juries, the change
provides for greater certainty of a fair trial. When all such reme-
dies are exhausted, the court can do no more to guarantee a fair
trial. The seemingly endless appeals flow in part from the trial
court's reluctance to use the methods available for reducing the
effect of pretrial publicity. By lowering the standard for granting
such motions, and thereby granting more pretrial publicity
motions, courts would, in effect, be reducing the amount of
appeals on the basis of prejudicial juries. Allowing only jurors
with no preconceived notions of guilt or innocence to sit on capi-
tal cases would eliminate some of these appeals as well. The
reduction in the number of appeals would, in many cases, lead to
lower appeal costs (something both proponents and opponents
of the death penalty would welcome) and quicker execution.
Even some of the more optimistic studies conclude that bias
can never truly be extinguished."' 7 Because jurors are not born
on the day of the trial, jurors are bound to take into trial with
them their life experiences, which undoubtedly effect their deci-
sions. 138 Despite this, the judicial system relies on jurors to make
135. 383 U.S. 333 (1966).
136. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
137. VALERIE P. HANs & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 245 (1986).
138. FELSHER, supra note 80, at 11: "One does not set aside opinions of a
lifetime, prejudices etched in a brain, because one steps into a courtroom to
determine the fate of a defendant. It is impossible to ignore facts (or purported
facts) about a case about to be tried. The brain has an infinite capacity to
absorb. Much of what is absorbed is subject to recall."
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the weight of the evidence before them at trial the primary deter-
minant when deciding on a verdict.1 3 9
To what extent can we permit the execution of defendants
whose guarantee of a fair trial has not been satisfactorily adhered
to? The precise value of "life" is something no one can ever truly
access. The affinity Americans feel for justice can be inferred
from the fact that we pride ourselves in our adherence to the
principles found in the Constitution. However, because of
today's media-dominated age, the freedom of the press in the
First Amendment can often conflict with the guarantee of a fair
trial from the Sixth Amendment.
Recent Supreme Court decisions leave no doubt that the
Court lines up on the side of the First Amendment when con-
fronted with a conflict between it and the "fair trial" provision of
the Sixth Amendment. The decisions of the court in Murphy, Stu-
art, and, most recently, Mu'min show that the court is willing to
make sacrifices on the side of the Sixth Amendment. In so
doing, the Court has diluted the guarantee of a fair trial even to
those sentenced to the ultimate penalty, execution.
There is potential to harmonize the First and Sixth Amend-
ments with just a little extra effort on the part of trial courts.
Even in today's society, where newspapers and television cover all
sensational murders, the guarantee of a fair trial can still be pro-
vided. The use of continuances and changes of venue appear to
be the most effective at combating the growing problem of preju-
dicial publicity. Trial courts must be willing to move or continue
a case when the prosecutor has stated he intends to seek the
death penalty and the media coverage has been prejudicial. The
fact that society has become more communicative should not
reduce its goal to have both a free press and fair trials.
A divided Court in Gregg v. Georgia14 reluctantly recognized
execution as a viable penalty that does not violate the "cruel and
unusual" punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. Never-
theless, it is cruel and unusual to put to death those persons
whose trial is tainted with avoidable prejudice.
139. HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 137, at 245.
140. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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